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The Incidence of Tobacco Taxation: Evidence from Geographic Micro-Level Data

The Incidence of Tobacco Taxation:
Evidence from Geographic
Micro-Level Data
Abstract – This paper uses a recent increase in Wisconsin’s tobacco
tax as a natural experiment to measure the economic incidence of
tobacco taxation, using micro-level data on cigarette prices from
retail locations in Wisconsin and states that share its border. We
find that Wisconsin’s $1 tobacco tax increase was over-shifted
to consumers; they pay the entire amount of the tax as well as a
premium of between 8–17 cents per pack of cigarettes. We also use
geo-coded data to test if the incidence of the tobacco tax is different
for locations near the border of states with different tobacco taxation.

I. INTRODUCTION

T
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obacco taxation is an important revenue source at the
state and federal level, and as a matter of policy is also
intended to reduce tobacco consumption. The federal government collected over $7.7 billion in revenue from tobacco taxes
in 20061, while state governments in the aggregate collect
an additional $15.2 billion annually in tobacco taxes.2 A key
component to understanding how effective a tobacco tax is
at reducing consumption3 is how the economic incidence of
the tax is split between consumers and producers. If the full
burden of a tobacco tax is passed on to consumers in the form
of higher prices it is more likely to discourage consumption,
1

2

and
3
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See U.S. Department of the Treasury, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade
Bureau, “Cumulative Summary, Fiscal Year 2006,” http://www.ttb.gov/
statistics/final06.pdf.
See U.S. Census Bureau, “State Government Tax Collections,” http://
www.census.gov/govs/www/statetax.html. This figure does not include
additional sales taxes collected on tobacco.
The economic justification for government intervention in the market for
tobacco products is that tobacco use (especially smoking tobacco) causes a
negative externality. For studies that measure the external effects of tobacco
use see Shoven, Sundberg, and Bunker (1989), Manning et al. (1989, 1991),
Gravelle and Zimmerman (1994), Viscusi (1995, 2002), Evans, Ringel, and
Stech (1999), Cutler et al. (2000), and Sloan et al. (2004). For studies that
measure the mortality cost per pack see Gruber and Koszegi (2001), Cutler
(2002), Sloan et al. (2004), and Viscusi and Hersch (2008). There have been
a wide variety of studies that analyze the demand for cigarettes, notably
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994), Evans, Ringel, and Stech (1999),
and Gruber and Koszegi (2001). For a comprehensive review of studies on
cigarette demand see Chaloupka and Warner (2000).
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We find that the $1 tax increase results
in a statistically significant retail price
increase of between $1.08–1.17 depending
on the econometric specification we use,
the type of cigarettes, and the type of retail
establishment. We find consistent evidence of over-shifting across both panel
and repeated cross-section econometric
specifications, and for both name brand
and generic cigarettes. We also show that
the amount of over-shifting is sensitive
to how far the retail establishment is
from the Wisconsin border and the state
border in question, although these results
are somewhat imprecise. Stores near the
Minnesota border (where the tobacco
tax is lower after the law change) do not
have as large of an over-shifting premium.
Stores near the Michigan border (where
the tobacco tax is higher before and after
the law change) have a larger over-shifting
premium.
We first give the details of Wisconsin’s
tobacco tax change, and lay out our
identification strategy for estimating
the incidence of tobacco taxation. Section III provides a description of our
unique micro-level data on cigarette
prices at retail establishments. Section
IV presents and discusses our regression
results for estimating the incidence of
tobacco taxation; it also includes a discussion of potential criticisms of our methodology. The final section of the paper
concludes.

and may be a more regressive tax because
tobacco users tend to be low income
individuals.4
Estimates of the incidence of tobacco
and cigarette taxation find a wide range
of results; from the tax burden being overshifted to consumers (they pay the full tax
plus a premium on top of the tax amount)
to concluding that tobacco taxes do not
raise prices by the amount of the tax.
Harris (1987) and Keeler et al. (1996) both
provide evidence using state level data
that show the burden of tobacco taxation
is over-shifted to consumers, although
their estimates of the amount of overshifting differ dramatically. Sumner and
Wohlgenant (1985) estimate that only the
amount of the tax is passed on to consumers, while Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987)
suggest that excise tax increases do not
consistently act to increase retail prices.
We estimate how the economic burden
of a tobacco tax is divided between retail
suppliers of cigarettes and consumers by
examining the price response to a recent
$1 change in Wisconsin’s state cigarette
tax. Our estimates have several advantages over previous estimates of tobacco
tax incidence. First, we use micro-level
data from retail locations matched to
both city and county taxes, instead of
relying on state-year variation (which
cannot account for different city and
county tax rates). Second, we analyze an
isolated policy change that offers clean
identification of the effects of the tobacco
tax increase on retail prices. Third, our
data come from an extremely short time
window and relatively small geographic
area, so we do not have to correct for
inflation over time or adjust for cost of
living across areas. Finally, our data are
geo-coded so we are able to test the price
responsiveness of retailers that are near a
bordering state where the tax treatment
of tobacco sales is different.
4
5

II. POLICY CHANGE BACKGROUND
AND IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY
We use a recent increase in the tax
on cigarettes in the state of Wisconsin
as a natural experiment to identify the
incidence of tobacco taxation. Beginning
January 1, 2008, Wisconsin increased the
state tax on cigarettes by $1, from 77 cents
to $1.77 per pack.5 While the cigarette tax

For a review of this literature see Poterba (1989), Fullerton and Metcalf (2002), and Gravelle (2007).
WI Act 20, amend sec. 139.31(1) (a) and (b), signed into law on October 26, 2007.
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a median increase of 39 cents per pack.
Wisconsin’s $1 increase matches the largest one time tobacco tax increase by any
state since 2000.8
We use a difference-in-differences
(D-D) approach to identify the retail price
response to the cigarette tax change. We
compare the difference in the retail price of
cigarettes in Wisconsin with surrounding
states before the tax change (December,
2007) with the difference in prices between
Wisconsin and surrounding states after
the tax change (January, 2008). The main
advantage of using this method is that it
controls for any fixed characteristics of
Wisconsin as well as any time trends in
all states that may also affect cigarette
prices.
Using the D-D method requires two
primary assumptions. The first is that
there are no factors other than the tax
increase that affect the change in cigarette
prices between December, 2007 and January, 2008 in Wisconsin. This assumption
seems particularly reasonable given that
the time elapsed between our data points
is at most 42 days. The second assumption is that prices in our control states
(IA, IL, MI, and MN) are not affected by
the policy change in Wisconsin. Our data
show that this assumption is not violated
on average, as the price change in our
control states is less than 1 cent for the full
sample.
We implement the D-D identification
strategy using both data from a panel and
repeated cross sections of retail cigarette
venders. The regression used to determine

increased by over 125 percent in Wisconsin at the start of 2008,6 the states that share
a border with Wisconsin did not change
their tax treatments of cigarettes at that
time. Table 1 shows the tax on cigarettes
in Wisconsin and the surrounding states
before and after the tax increase took
effect. As shown in Table 1, Wisconsin
went from having the lowest tax on cigarettes to having the second highest in the
group of states that share its border.
We use the differential change in Wisconsin and absence of change in states
that share its border to identify how the
tax affects the retail tax inclusive price,
and thus measure the incidence of the tax.
The policy change we analyze reflects a
substantial tax increase compared to other
recent tobacco tax changes. Since January 1, 2000 there have been 83 separate
state level cigarette tax increases,7 with
Table 1
State Cigarette Tax Package
December ‘07

January ‘08

Illinois1,2,3
$0.98
$0.98
Iowa3
$1.36
$1.36
Michigan
$2.00
$2.00
Minnesota
$1.485
$1.485
3
Wisconsin
$0.77
$1.77
Notes:
1
Cook County, IL has an additional $2 per pack tax
on cigarettes.
2
The City of Chicago has an additional 68 cents per
pack tax on cigarettes.
3
WI, IL, and IA have different sales tax rates by city and
county, we include these rates, as well as state rates
for MN and MI in our analysis. A complete listing of
sales tax rates used for all 270 cities in our sample is
available from the authors upon request.
Source: Federation of Tax Administrators, “Cigarette
Tax Increases 2000–2008,” http://www.taxadmin.
org/fta/rate/cig_inc02.html

6

7

8

We expect an immediate response in the retail price of cigarettes on January 1, 2008 because of the way the
new tax is collected. According to conversations with administrators at the Wisconsin Department of Revenue,
the Wisconsin tobacco tax increase was also levied on inventories of cigarettes at the retail level on January
1, 2008. Store owners were required to pay the new tax on all cigarettes in inventory as of January 1, 2008.
Although this raises some concerns about the price response of retailers prior to the tax change, it means that
we expect an immediate price response when the tax is enacted.
Oregon is the only state to decrease the tobacco tax during this time period, doing so by 10 cents at the beginning
of 2004. See Federation of Tax Administrators, “Cigarette Tax Increases 2000–2008,” http://www.taxadmin.
org/fta/rate/cig_inc02.html.
Since 2000 Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Montana, South Dakota, and Texas also increased the tax per pack of
cigarettes by $1.
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price data on in at least one time period
(December or January). The regression
used to determine the effect of the tax
increase using the repeated cross section
of stores is:

the effect of the tax increase using the
panel data is:
(1)

(Pi,jan – Pi,dec) = α + β1(Wisconsin) + εi

where Wisconsin is a dummy variable
equal to one if the store is located in
that state, and Pi,jan and Pi,dec are the tax
inclusive price of cigarettes for store i in
January and December. Analyzing a panel
of stores and using the change in price as
our dependent variable means that we
control for any attributes of the store that
remain constant between December, 2007
and January, 2008 such as the type of retail
establishment (for example whether the
store is a convenience or grocery store)
and its location. Because we have information about the type of retail establishment,
we run regressions for (1) using our entire
panel as well as separate regressions for
the various types of establishments, and
for stores that are within a short distance
of the state border.
The parameter of interest in (1) is β1,
which shows how the $1 tax increase in
Wisconsin affects the change in cigarette
prices. If β1 < 1, this implies that the full
burden of the tax is not passed on to consumers, as some of the tax burden falls on
cigarette retailers. If β1 = 1, then the burden
of the cigarette tax increase is fully borne by
consumers in the form of higher prices. If β1
> 1, the tax on cigarettes is “over-shifted” to
consumers, as they bear the entire burden
of the tax and pay a premium above the
tax amount. If the tax is over-shifted to
consumers, it is likely that the retail market
for cigarettes is imperfect.9
We also implement the D-D identification strategy using a repeated cross section
of stores in our data. This strategy allows
us to use all stores for which we have
9

10

(2)

Pi,t = α + β1(Wisconsin) + β2(January)
+ β3(Wisconsin * January) + Zi′γ + εi

where, as in the panel regression, Wisconsin is a dummy variable equal to one if the
store is located in that state. For cross-section identification, Pi,t is the tax inclusive
price from store i in time period t, where t
is either December, 2007 or January, 2008.
January is a dummy variable equal to one
if the observation is from the period after
the tax increase. Z is a vector of control
variables that includes a dummy variable
indicating whether the store is a national
retailer, a dummy variable indicating if
the store is a tobacco-only retailer, a convenience store, or a grocery store. Z also
includes a dummy variable for the state
level location of the store. The coefficient
of interest in (2) is β3, which has the same
interpretation as β1 in (1).
III. DATA
Our data come from telephone surveys
of cigarette retailers at tobacco specialty,
grocery, and convenience stores in Wisconsin, Illinois, Minnesota, Iowa, and the
upper peninsula of Michigan. We created
a list of 1,542 stores that sell cigarettes in
these states using phone book listings and
internet searches by geography.10 We contacted each establishment in December,
2007 (before the tax increase) and again
in January, 2008 (after the tax increase) to
request the retail price of cigarettes.

For a detailed discussion of theoretical models of tax incidence that produce over-shifting see Fullerton and
Metcalf (2002).
We created the majority of our store list using an internet search engine by searching “tobacco store” and
“convenience store” by geography for each state in our sample. This search provided the store name, phone
number, and address for the stores in our sample.
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•

We implemented the first phase of
surveys between December 17, 2007 and
December 23, 2007. In the pre-tax change
wave, 70 percent of stores provided price
information, for a total of 1,072 data
points. 11 We implemented the second
phase of surveys between January 9,
2008 and January 28, 2008. A total of 1,107
stores provided cigarette price information in the post-tax change phase, a 72
percent response rate.12 We created our
panel using the 65 percent of stores on
our list (1,002 stores) that provided price
information in both the pre-tax change
and post-tax change phases.
We requested price information on two
types of cigarettes from the stores in our
survey—a premium brand and generic
brand.13 Our survey consisted of the following questions:
•
•

•

“What is the price per pack of Generic
Brand Cigarettes?”
“Does that price of Generic Brand
cigarettes include the sales and
tobacco tax?”

A total of 614 (57 percent) out of the
1,072 stores that gave price information
for the name brand cigarettes in the first
phase also gave price information for the
generic brand cigarettes. In the second
phase, 641 (58 percent) out of the 1,107
stores that gave price information on the
name brand also gave price information
on the generic brand.14
In the first phase of our survey, about 28
percent of stores from which we were not
able to obtain price information actively
refused to give the price of cigarettes.
In the second phase about 26 percent of
stores from which we were not able to
obtain price information actively refused
to give the price of cigarettes.15 Table 2
highlights the difference in stores that
refused to give price information with
those that responded to our survey. As

“What is the price per pack of Name
Brand Cigarettes?”
“Does that price of Name Brand cigarettes include the sales and tobacco
tax?”

Table 2
Comparison of Survey Respondents and Refusals
December
Respondents

Refused

January
Percent
Refusing

Respondents

Refused

Percent
Refusing

Convenience
809
108
11.78
835
101
10.79
Grocer
156
17
9.83
157
6
3.68
Tobacco
107
9
7.76
115
8
6.50
Chain
434
77
15.07
455
66
12.67
Note: The refusal rate is calculated as the number who actively refused to give price information divided by the
number who responded plus the number who refused.
11

12

13
14

15

In the first wave of surveys, 470 “stores” did not yield price information. Of these, 68 did not sell cigarettes,
82 were either a wrong phone number or a disconnected line, 134 refused to give cigarette price information
over the phone, 163 did not answer our calls, and the remaining 23 were not used because of various reliability
concerns.
In the second wave of surveys, 435 “stores” did not yield price information. Of these, 40 did not sell cigarettes,
94 were either a wrong number or a disconnected line, 115 refused to give cigarette price information over the
phone, 137 did not answer our calls, and the remaining 49 were not used because of various reliability concerns.
To keep consistent across locations we asked for the same name and generic brand from each store surveyed.
According to conversations with the Wisconsin and Minnesota Departments of revenue the total number
of cigarette retailers in those states is about 13,000 and 9,500, respectively (including bars and restaurants).
Administrators in Iowa, Michigan, and Illinois were not able to provide an estimate of the number of cigarette
retailers.
Note that the share of stores that actively refused to give price information was a small share of the total stores
that we contacted—8 percent in the first phase and 7 percent in the second phase.

681

NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL
In addition to information about the
type of retail establishment, we also have
the street address for each store in our
sample. We use GIS software to calculate
the distance from the Wisconsin border
for each store in our sample. Of the stores
in our sample we were able to locate 941
(94 percent) of the addresses exactly. For
the remaining 6 percent of stores that we
could not match exactly, we use the center
of the city or zip code where the store is
located to measure the distance to the
nearest Wisconsin border. Tables 3 and 4
show how our sample of stores varies by
both the average distance to the Wisconsin
border and for stores within five miles of
the border across all states.
Table 3 (name brand) and Table 4
(generic) provide a summary of our price
data across several dimensions. The average price of name brand cigarettes in the
pre-tax change survey is $4.36 per pack.
Importantly for our identification strategy, the average price for name brand
cigarettes in our control states (IL, MN,
MI, IA) did not change by more than 6
cents (MI). The average price of generic
brand cigarettes in the pre-tax change
survey is $3.83. In the post tax-change
survey, the average price of generic brand
cigarettes increased by 46 cents to $4.29.
The average price of the generic brand
cigarettes changed fairly substantially in
two of our control states, which violates
one of our identification assumptions
for difference-in-differences estimation.
The average price of the generic brand
cigarettes increased by 14 cents in Illinois,
and by 10 cents in Michigan.
Table 3 (name brand) and Table 4
(generic) also show how our price data
differs for stores that are within five miles
of the Wisconsin state border. As Table 3

the table shows, convenience stores were
more likely to actively refuse to give
price information than both grocery and
tobacco-only stores. Also, stores that
were national chains were more likely to
actively refuse than other stores. Because
there are differences in the response rate
across the type of stores, we are careful to
account for store type in our estimation
strategy.
We merged information on state,
county, and city sales taxes, gathered
from each state’s department of revenue,16
with our price data to calculate the taxinclusive price for each observation.17
Wisconsin, Illinois, and Iowa have different sales tax rates across cities, while
cities in the upper peninsula of Michigan
all have a 6 percent sales tax rate. In addition to the state of Illinois tobacco taxes,
Cook County, IL has a $2 tax per pack, and
the city of Chicago has a 68 cents tax per
pack. We contacted each state department
of revenue (as well as city and county
where appropriate) to ensure that there
were no other changes, besides the $1 per
pack increase in Wisconsin, made to sales
or cigarette taxes between December 17,
2007 and January 28, 2008 for the cities in
our sample.
We classified the stores in our data by
retail establishment type based on the
store name. We classified stores as tobacco
specialty, grocery, or convenience stores.
We were also able to differentiate those
that were national chain stores from
local or regional establishments. Out of
the 1,002 stores in our panel data, 101
(10 percent) are tobacco specialty stores,
148 (15 percent) are grocery stores, and
the remaining 753 (75 percent) are convenience stores. About 40 percent (406
stores) are national chain retailers.
16

17

State, county, and city sales tax rates are available at: (1) Illinois Department of Revenue, “Tax Rate Finder,”
http://www.revenue.state.il.us/; (2) Iowa Department of Revenue, “Sales Tax Rate Look Up,” http://www.
iowa.gov/tax; (3) Michigan Department of Revenue, “Taxes,” http://www.michigan.gov/treasury; Minnesota
Department of Revenue, “Sales and Use Tax,” http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/; (4) Wisconsin Department of
Revenue, “Tax Rates,” http://www.dor.state.wi.us/.
The sales tax rates used to calculate the tax-inclusive prices are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3
Summary Statistics for Name Brand Cigarettes
Wisconsin

Illinois

Minnesota

Michigan

Iowa

All
States

December 2007 Survey
Average price ($)
Standard deviation (Price)
Minimum price ($)
Maximum price ($)
Average distance to WI border (miles)
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border
Average border store price ($)
Average non-border store price ($)
Average convenience store price ($)
Number of convenience stores
Average grocery store price ($)
Number of grocery stores
Average tobacco store price ($)
Number of tobacco stores
Average national chain store price ($)
Number of national chain stores
Number of respondents

3.87
(0.29)
3.41
5.00
35.84
87
3.82
3.88
3.86
369
3.96
68
3.81
29
3.86
197
466

4.92
(1.49)
3.70
8.93
76.08
32
4.26
5.02
5.01
143
5.30
43
4.27
46
5.30
72
232

4.31
(0.25)
3.97
5.40
38.69
43
4.32
4.30
4.30
156
4.39
31
4.18
10
4.25
89
197

5.16
(0.35)
4.31
6.10
33.09
20
4.96
5.25
5.14
54
5.32
6
NA
0
4.98
32
60

4.89
(0.42)
4.19
5.60
88.38
18
4.64
4.94
5.02
87
4.88
8
4.39
22
5.01
44
117

4.36
(0.89)
3.41
8.93
50.65
200
4.18
4.40
4.36
809
4.51
156
4.16
107
4.38
434
1,072

January 2008 Survey
Average price ($)
Standard deviation (Price)
Minimum price ($)
Maximum price ($)
Average distance to WI border (miles)
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border
Average border store price ($)
Average non-border store price ($)
Average convenience store price ($)
Number of convenience stores
Average grocery store price ($)
Number of grocery stores
Average tobacco store price ($)
Number of tobacco stores
Average national chain store price ($)
Number of national chain stores
Number of respondents

5.00
(0.33)
3.80
6.63
35.62
88
4.95
5.01
4.99
363
5.10
70
4.89
31
5.00
201
464

4.88
(1.45)
3.72
8.93
80.14
33
4.24
4.99
4.98
153
5.21
42
4.33
51
5.31
79
246

4.32
(0.29)
4.05
5.40
38.17
49
4.36
4.30
4.31
167
4.37
31
4.24
10
4.23
96
208

5.22
(0.40)
4.23
6.47
34.25
20
4.99
5.32
5.21
59
5.35
5
NA
0
5.01
33
64

4.89
(0.43)
3.69
5.55
88.64
19
4.70
4.93
5.01
93
4.81
9
4.42
23
5.01
46
125

4.85
(0.79)
3.69
8.93
51.90
209
4.68
4.89
4.87
835
4.98
157
4.49
115
4.89
455
1,107

for the price of the generic brand cigarettes
at stores located within five miles of the
Wisconsin border.

shows, the average price of name brand
cigarettes at stores within five miles of the
Wisconsin border is less than the average
price for stores further from the border
in all states except Minnesota. In 2008,
the discount for stores near the border
is largest in Illinois, where stores within
five miles of the Wisconsin border have
an average price that is about 75 cents less
than other stores in the state. The border
discount in 2008 is also substantial in
Michigan and Iowa, where stores within
five miles of the Wisconsin border have an
average price that is between 23–33 cents
per pack less than other stores in those
states. A similar pattern does not emerge

IV. ESTIMATES OF TOBACCO TAX
INCIDENCE
Using our unique micro level data on
the retail price of cigarettes in Wisconsin
and surrounding states, we can make several comparisons that allow us to identify
the economic incidence of the tobacco tax
increase. Figure 1 shows a visual representation of the price changes that occur
between December, 2007 (before the tax
increase) and January, 2008 (after the tax
683
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Table 4
Summary Statistics for Generic Brand Cigarettes
Wisconsin

Illinois

Minnesota

Michigan

Iowa

All
States

December 2007 Survey
Average price ($)
Standard deviation (Price)
Minimum price ($)
Maximum price ($)
Average distance to WI border (miles)
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border
Average border store price ($)
Average non-border store price ($)
Average convenience store price ($)
Number of convenience stores
Average grocery store price ($)
Number of grocery stores
Average tobacco store price ($)
Number of tobacco stores
Average national chain store price ($)
Number of national chain stores
Number of respondents

3.42
(0.32)
2.11
4.91
32.02
53
3.47
3.41
3.44
179
3.34
35
3.43
20
3.43
104
234

3.79
(0.33)
2.66
5.03
95.28
18
3.82
3.78
3.82
57
3.75
20
3.76
29
3.75
23
106

3.99
(0.20)
3.44
4.70
39.27
37
3.99
4.00
3.99
124
4.03
25
3.87
8
3.97
67
157

4.51
(0.83)
3.18
6.51
30.02
5
3.78
4.84
4.51
16
NA
0
NA
0
4.46
10
16

4.48
(0.47)
3.54
5.35
88.51
15
4.37
4.50
4.65
67
4.43
8
3.98
21
4.68
35
96

3.83
(0.52)
2.11
6.51
53.75
128
3.78
3.84
3.86
443
3.73
88
3.74
78
3.84
239
609

January 2008 Survey
Average price ($)
Standard deviation (Price)
Minimum price ($)
Maximum price ($)
Average distance to WI border (miles)
Number of stores within 5 miles of WI border
Average border store price ($)
Average non-border store price ($)
Average convenience store price ($)
Number of convenience stores
Average grocery store price ($)
Number of grocery stores
Average tobacco store price ($)
Number of tobacco stores
Average national chain store price ($)
Number of national chain stores
Number of respondents

4.58
(0.30)
3.35
5.90
31.49
51
4.60
4.57
4.58
161
4.61
29
4.48
22
4.58
104
212

3.93
(0.64)
3.25
7.62
105.95
21
3.88
3.94
4.05
69
3.96
19
3.70
36
3.98
30
124

4.03
(0.22)
3.24
4.82
40.06
44
4.04
4.03
4.04
132
4.06
29
3.91
9
4.01
74
170

4.61
(0.62)
3.60
5.40
56.73
1
3.60
4.81
4.61
6
NA
0
NA
0
4.37
4
6

4.50
(0.46)
3.47
5.23
90.18
15
4.37
4.52
4.63
80
4.47
7
4.03
21
4.69
40
108

4.29
(0.50)
3.24
7.62
59.20
132
4.26
4.29
4.35
448
4.26
84
4.00
88
4.36
252
620

data from our survey of cigarette retailers. Regression results using the panel
data estimating (1) show that not only do
consumers pay the entire $1 per pack tax
increase, but they pay between a 12–17
cents premium on top of the tax increase.
That is, as shown in column (1) of Table
5, we estimate β1 to be equal to about 1.12
for name brand cigarettes and about 1.17
for the generic brand using the full sample
of retail locations. Both of these results are
precisely estimated, as they are statistically different from zero at less than the
one-percent level. The 95 percent confidence interval for the estimates in column
(1) also shows that the point estimates are
significantly larger than $1, evidence that

increase) at the locations in our sample
for both the generic and name brand cigarettes. Each dot in Figure 1 represents the
price change of a retail location between
December, 2007 and January, 2008. As
shown by the maps in Figure 1, prices in
Wisconsin increased almost universally by
more than the $1 tax for both the generic
and name brand cigarettes. Figure 1 also
displays how well the Border States work
as a control group, as most locations
in other states did not change cigarette
prices at all between December, 2007 and
January, 2008.
To get a precise estimate of the price
response to the tax change illustrated in
Figure 1, we estimate (1) and (2) using
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Figure 1
Cigarette Price Change, December 2007–January 2008
Name brand cigarettes

Generic cigarettes

Price Change

Price Change
–$2.27 - –$0.01
$0.00
$0.01 - $1.00
$1.01 - $2.15

–$1.26 - –$0.01
$0.00
$0.01 - $1.00
$1.01 - $2.23

Source: Maps were created using Arcmap GIS software, and the data from a survey of cigarette retail establishments.

tobacco specialty store estimates suggest
that these stores do not include as large
a premium above the tax as other stores,
which suggests that this type of retail
store does not possess the same degree of
market power that other types of stores in
our survey may.18
Regression results estimating (2),
shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table
6, using the cross-section data for name
brand cigarettes, reinforce the findings
from the panel data estimates. Column
(1) shows the cross-section results without
using the indicator variables for the type
of retail establishment, and column (2)
shows the estimates controlling for the
type of retail establishment. The coefficient of interest in each case, β3, which is
comparable to β1 in the panel regression,
is within 1 cent of the panel estimates
confirming the over-shifting of the tobacco
tax that we estimate in the panel regres-

the tax increase caused a price increase
larger than the amount of the tax.
Columns 2–5 of Table 5 show regression results for the various types of retail
establishments in the panel data. These
results confirm the finding that the $1 tax
per pack increase is more than passed on
to consumers in the form of higher prices,
and that this result is not unique to the
type of retail establishment. The results
for both the generic and name brand
cigarettes sold at grocery and convenience
stores, columns (4) and (5) of Table 5, show
that β1 is less than 1 cent different than
the coefficient using the entire sample,
indicating no unique response from these
types of stores. The estimates for β1 in the
specification using data from stores that
are tobacco specialty establishments are
about $1.10 for the name brand and about
$1.13 for the generic, roughly 3 to 4 cents
less than the full sample estimates. The
18

In results not shown, we estimated (1) with interactions for the store type and the Wisconsin variable to test
the hypothesis that the price change across store types is different. An F-test shows the coefficients of the
interaction between store type and Wisconsin are not significantly different.
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Table 5
Effect of $1 Tax Increase on Cigarette Prices, Results Using Panel Data

Wisconsin (β1)
95% Confidence for β1
N
R2
Wisconsin (β1)
95% Confidence for β1

Full Panel
(1)

National Chain
(2)

1.1275***
(0.0093)

1.117***
(0.0154)

1.1023***
(0.0455)

Convenience
(4)

Grocery
(5)

1.1316***
(0.0102)

1.1313***
(0.0217)

[1.1093 , 1.1458] [1.0868 , 1.1472] [1.0119 , 1.1926] [1.1116 , 1.1516] [1.0884 , 1.1742]
1002
0.9364

407
0.9287

101
0.8555

753
0.9423

148
0.949

1.1763***
(0.0246)

1.2081***
(0.0391)

Generic
1.1363***
(0.0456)

1.1805***
(0.0309)

1.1791***
(0.0578)

[1.1279 , 1.2247] [1.1308 , 1.2854] [1.0452 , 1.2274] [1.1197 , 1.2412] [1.0637 , 1.2946]
474
0.8287

N
R2

Name Brand
Tobacco
(3)

184
0.8393

71
0.8997

338
0.8119

65
0.8687

Notes: Results include only the sample of stores for which we have both December and January data. Sample
includes stores in IA, IL, MN, WI, and the upper peninsula of MI. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***) level.

Table 6
Effect of $1 Tax Increase on Cigarette Prices, Results Using Repeated Cross-Section Data
Name Brand

Generic

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

–1.0230***
(0.0628)

–1.0888***
(0.0620)

–1.0367***
(0.0390)

–1.0641***
(0.0383)

January (β2)

–0.0044
(0.0421)

–0.0023
(0.0413)

0.0669**
(0.0271)

.0663**
(0.0265)

Wisconsin*January (β3)

1.1362***
(0.0644)

1.1345***
(0.0632)

1.0892***
(0.0450)

1.0943***
(0.0439)

Wisconsin (β1)

0.0749**
(0.0348)

–0.0058
(0.0240)

Tobacco only store

–0.4086***
(0.0552)

–0.2623***
(0.0334)

Grocery store

0.1642***
(0.0484)

–0.0536
(0.0333)

National chain

95% Confidence for (β3)
N
R2

[1.0098 , 1.2627]

[1.0104 , 1.2585]

[1.0009 , 1.1776]

[1.0081 , 1.1805]

2,179
0.2779

2,179
0.3058

1,229
0.5398

1,229
0.5631

Notes: Results include the full sample of stores for which we have data on in at least one period. Sample includes
stores in IA, IL, MN, WI, and the upper peninsula of MI. The convenience store dummy variable is excluded;
results are not sensitive to which dummy variable is excluded. All specifications include state level dummy variables for IL, MN and MI and exclude a dummy variable for IA. The results presented for the coefficient of interest
are not sensitive to the state dummy excluded. Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***) and 5% (**) levels.
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stores shows that stores specializing in
tobacco products sell both name brand (40
cents) and generic (26 cents) for substantially less than the other types of stores
surveyed.

sions. The 95 percent confidence interval
for each of these estimates is larger than
the panel regressions; however, our results
are still significantly different from zero at
the 1 percent level.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 show the
regression results for estimating (2) using
the cross-section data for the generic brand
cigarettes. Column (3) shows the cross-section results without controls, and column
(4) shows the results controlling for the
type of retail establishment. The coefficient
of interest, β3, is quite a bit lower than
the comparable β1 from the panel regressions. We estimate the price increase as a
result of the tax change is approximately
$1.09 for generic brand cigarettes using
the repeated cross-section data, roughly 8
cents less than the estimate using the panel
data. Again, these results are statistically
significant at the one percent level, with
the confidence interval indicating that 95
percent of the distribution is greater than
$1. Although the cross-section results for
the generic brand cigarettes suggest a
smaller premium than the panel results,
they still show evidence of over-shifting
of the tax burden on to consumers.
The difference in the coefficient estimate
between the panel and repeated cross section for generic cigarettes is likely caused
by the substantial decrease in the grocery
store premium. As the grocery store coefficient in column (4) of Table 6 shows, grocery stores sell the generic brand cigarettes
for about 5 cents less than other stores;
however, the panel estimates for grocery
stores indicate that they actually raised
their price more than other stores. It seems
that the grocery stores that responded to
our survey both in January and December
were more likely to have raised their price
more for the generic brand cigarettes than
those who responded to only one of the
surveys. The coefficient for tobacco-only
19

A. Estimates of Tobacco Tax Incidence
by Geography
Wisconsin shares a border with states
that have a range of tobacco tax rates, from
98 cents–$2. Because of the possibility for
casual smuggling19 in areas close to the
border, the retail cigarette market may
not be confined to the state. We can test
for the possibility that the incidence of the
tobacco tax varies across distance from a
specific state’s border using our geo-coded
data and altering the econometric specifications in (1) and (2). To test the effect that
distance from the Wisconsin state border
has on tax incidence, we group the data
into stores that are within one, five, 10, and
25 miles of each state border (IA, MN, MI,
IL). We create an indicator variable equal
to one for each of these groupings and
run separate regressions for each distance
category using panel data with following
econometric specification:
(3)

(Pi,jan – Pi,dec)
= α + β1(Inside Mile * Statej) + εi

where Inside Mile is an indicator variable
that is equal to one if a store is within one,
five, 10, or 25 miles of the state border,
and Statej is a variable indicating the state
border in question where j references
either MN, IL, IA, or MI. We estimate (3)
using only stores in Wisconsin, which
allows us to test the differential effect of
the tax change by comparing stores closer
to another state’s border with stores that
are further in the interior of the state. The

For studies on cross-border cigarette smuggling see Baltagi and Levin (1986), Gruber, Sen, and Stabile (2003),
Stehr (2005), and Lovenheim (2008).
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coefficient of interest is β1 (estimated in a
separate regression for each distance and
state border) which, if different from zero,
tells us that stores in Wisconsin within the
distance boundaries split the incidence of
the tobacco tax differently with consumers than those further from the Wisconsin
border. Notice that the β1 coefficients in the
panel specifications are not a general distance premium as the dependent variable
is the change in the price of cigarettes. The
results for each separate regression by distance from the state border in question are
presented together in Table 7 for both the
name brand and generic brand cigarettes.
As Table 7 shows, the point estimates in
each separate regression for the amount
of over-shifting of the tax is sensitive
to being near a state border, and to the

specific state border in question. For the
name brand cigarettes, the only result that
attains (marginal) statistical significance
is for stores within 25 miles of the Illinois
state border, where the over-shifting of the
tax on the name brand cigarettes is about
4 cents less than stores in other parts of
the state. This result suggests that stores
near the Illinois state border over-shift
the tax on the name brand cigarettes by
about 31 percent less than the stores in
the remainder of the state do.
The incidence estimation results shown
in Table 7 for stores near the Wisconsin
border using the generic brand cigarettes
and panel data display a different pattern
than the name brand results as well as a
higher degree of precision. Again, we run
separate regressions for each distance

Table 7
Effect of $1 Tax Increase on Cigarette Prices By Distance to Border, Results Using Panel Data
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Name Brand
IL Border
MI Border
(2)
(3)

MN Border
(1)

IA Border
(4)

Inside 1 Mile * Statej (β1)

0.035
(.035)

–0.065
(.071)

–0.034
(.042)

–0.051
(.112)

Inside 5 Miles * Statej (β1)

0.021
(.028)

–0.054
(.036)

–0.03
(.033)

0.068
(.060)

Inside 10 Miles * Statej (β1)

0.015
(.027)

–0.031
(.026)

–0.025
(.031)

0.02
(.048)

Inside 25 Mile * Statej (β1)

0.012
(.025)

–0.04*
(.022)

–0.036
(.030)

0.004
(.037)

N= 423 in all specifications
Generic
Inside 1 Mile * Statej (β1)

–0.125**
(.062)

Inside 5 Miles * Statej (β1)

–0.097*
(.050)

0.053
(.103)

.164 *
(.094)

0.109
(.144)

Inside 10 Miles * Statej (β1)

–.094*
(.049)

–0.016
( .067)

.164*
(.094)

0.062
(.125)

Inside 25 Miles * Statej (β1)

–.110 **
(.047)

0.033
(.063)

.164*
(.094)

–0.021
(.096)

.263**
(.109)

N = 161 in all specifications
Notes: Results include only the sample of stores in Wisconsin for which we have both December and January data.
Results reflect separate regressions for each distance measure and each state border using only stores in Wisconsin, the β1 coefficient is reported from each separate regression. Asterisks denote significance at the 5% (**)
and 10% (*) levels.
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using data from only stores in Wisconsin.
The β3 coefficients are the combined effect
of the tax and of being close to a specific
neighboring state’s border. We run separate regressions for each border and each
measure of closeness to border (one, five,
10, and 25 miles) compared to being in
other areas of Wisconsin. The β3 coefficients have the same interpretation as the
β1 coefficients in (3). The β2 coefficient for
the cross-section specifications provide
an estimate of the general premium or
discount for retail outlets near the border
of a specific neighboring state (but inside
of Wisconsin), which we could not obtain
using the panel specification. As with the
panel data, we run separate regressions
for each measure of distance and each
state border using the cross-section data
and (4). Table 8 and 9 show estimation
results of separate regressions for (4)
using each measure of distance and each
state border.
The incidence estimates on the name
brand cigarettes for the cross-section
results by distance are generally consistent
with the panel data estimates. Unfortunately, these results are not estimated with
much precision, as we cannot attach statistical significance to any of the β3 coefficients
for the name brand estimates using crosssection data. The name brand cross-section
estimates do, however, produce interesting
results for the β2 coefficient, or the general
price effect of being close to another state
border. Column (1) of Table 8 shows that
there is a substantial discount offered at
stores in Wisconsin that are within five, 10,
and 25 miles of the Minnesota state border. This discount is between 11–13 cents
per pack of cigarettes and is statistically
significant at the one or five percent level
depending on the specification.
The other β2 coefficient that is noteworthy is on the price of name brand
cigarettes near the Illinois border that sell
for a premium compared to other areas of
the state. Column (2) of Table 8 shows that
the retail price of name brand cigarettes at

and state border given. Column (1) in the
bottom half of Table 7 shows evidence
that stores near the Minnesota border
over-shift the burden of the tax on the
generic brand cigarettes by substantially
less than stores in other parts of the state.
The estimates of β1 suggest that the tax is
over-shifted by between 9–13 cents less
than stores in other areas of the state,
statistically significant at the ten or five
percent level depending on the mileage
in question. These estimates imply that
at least 53 percent of the over-shifting
premium disappears, with at most 71
percent disappearing for stores near the
Minnesota border.
Column (3) in the bottom half of Table
7 shows that the over-shifting premium
for the generic brand cigarettes is between
16–26 cents larger for stores near the
Michigan border than in other areas of the
state; the estimates of β1 are statistically
significant at the five or ten percent level
depending on the mileage in question.
The estimates by distance to the Michigan
border translate into at least a 93 percent
increase of the amount of over-shifting
and as much as a 149 percent increase
in over-shifting in comparison to other
stores.
To test the effect that distance has on
the incidence of tobacco taxation using
cross-sectional data we use the following
econometric specification, and estimate
separate regressions for each distance
state border pair:
(4)

Pi,t = α + β1(January)
+ β2(Inside Mile * Statej)
+ β3(January *Inside Mile * Statej)
+ Zi′γ + εi

where, as in (2), the Zi represents store
level characteristics, Statej is a variable
that indicates being near the state border
in question, where j references either MN,
IL, IA, or MI. We run the regression for (4)
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Table 8
Effect of $1 Tax Increase on Cigarette Prices By Distance to Border, Results Using Cross-Section Data
for Name Brand Cigarettes
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
MN Border
(1)

IL Border
(2)

MI Border
(3)

IA Border
(4)

Inside 1 Mile * Statej (β2)

–0.065
(.081)

0.176
(.139)

–0.074
(.076)

0.046
(.220)

Inside 5 Miles* Statej (β2)

–.132***
(.049)

0.065
(.067)

–0.045
(.061)

0.114
(.104)

Inside 10 Miles* Statej (β2)

–.131***
(.048)

0.039
(.049)

–0.057
(.059)

0.112
(.084)

Inside 25 Miles* Statej (β2)

–.116**
(.045)

.067*
(.040)

–0.059
(.056)

0.102
(.066)

January*Inside 1 Mile*Statej (β3)

0.018
(.113)

–0.066
(.197)

–0.055
(.135)

–0.051
(.311)

January*Inside 5 Miles*Statej (β3)

0.038
(.069)

–0.035
(.097)

–0.074
(.107)

–0.018
(.152)

January*Inside 10 Miles*Statej (β3)

0.036
(.067)

–0.022
(.070)

–0.069
(.101)

–0.016
(.121)

January*Inside 25 Miles*Statej (β3)

0.028
(.064)

–0.025
(.058)

–0.08
(.094)

–0.047
(.094)

N = 930 in all specifications
Notes: Results include the full sample of stores for which we have data on in at least one period. All Regressions
include the January indicator as well as grocery, tobacco and national chain variables, the convenience store
dummy is excluded, results are not sensitive to which dummy variable is excluded. Results reflect separate
regressions for each distance measure and each state border using only stores in Wisconsin, the β2 and β3 coefficients for a given distance and state are reported for each separate regression. Asterisks denote significance at
the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.

β2 coefficient on stores near the Michigan
border. These results, shown in column
(3) of Table 9, suggest that the general
price effect of being close to the Michigan
border is large and statistically significant
for most specifications. The estimates of
β2 suggest that stores in Wisconsin within
25 miles of the Michigan border sell the
generic brand cigarettes for as much as 37
cents per pack more than stores in other
areas of the state.

stores within 25 miles of the Illinois border
sell for about 7 cents more than at stores
in other areas of the state, statistically
significant at the ten percent level.
The incidence estimates for the generic
brand cigarettes using cross-section data
by distance are generally not consistent
with the panel data estimates or the name
brand results, as shown in Table 9. None of
the β3 coefficients is statistically different
than zero, and most of the point estimates
are smaller than the panel estimates. The
increase in over-shifting we found for the
generic brand near the Michigan state
border using the panel results does not
hold up to statistical significance tests in
the cross-section specification, and in some
cases we find the opposite sign.
The generic brand cross-section estimates produce an interesting result for the

B. Explanation of Tobacco Tax Incidence
Results
Our primary estimates of the incidence of
tobacco taxation are that the $1 tax increase
is over-shifted to consumers by between
8–17 cents depending on the econometric
specification and the type of cigarettes. Our
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Table 9
Effect of $1 Tax Increase on Cigarette Prices By Distance to Border, Results Using Cross-Section Data
for Generic Brand Cigarettes
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
MN Border
(1)

IL Border
(2)

MI Border
(3)

Inside 1 Mile * Statej (β2)

0.022
(.086)

–0.165
(.311)

0.148
(.132)

Inside 5 Miles* Statej (β2)

0.011
(.055)

0.054
(.119)

.212*
(.111)

0.201
(.156)

Inside 10 Miles* Statej (β2)

0.008
(.054)

–0.042
(.076)

.371***
(.098)

0.139
(.140)

Inside 25 Miles* Statej (β2)

–0.001
(.053)

–0.103
(.068)

.371***
(.098)

0.029
(.101)

January*Inside 1 Mile*Statej (β3)

–0.046
(.123)

January*Inside 5 Miles*Statej (β3)

–0.054
(.080)

–0.069
(.163)

0.112
(.208)

–0.013
( .221)

January*Inside 10 Miles*Statej (β3)

–0.047
(.078)

–0.069
(.103)

–0.086
(.197)

–0.015
(.190)

January*Inside 25 Miles*Statej (β3)

–0.065
( .075)

–0.01
(.095)

–0.086
(.197)

–0.028
(.142)

IA Border
(4)

0.197
(.296)

N = 446 in all specifications
Notes: Results include the full sample of stores in Wisconsin for which we have data on in at least one period.
All Regressions include the January indicator as well as grocery, tobacco and national chain variables, the
convenience store dummy is excluded, results are not sensitive to which dummy variable is excluded. Results
reflect separate regressions for each distance measure and each state border using only stores in Wisconsin, the
β2 and β3 coefficients for a given distance and state are reported for each separate regression. Asterisks denote
significance at the 1% (***) and 10% (*) levels.

estimates for stores near the state border
suggest that the degree of over-shifting is
sensitive to being near the Minnesota or
Michigan state borders. Our primary estimates are similar in magnitude to Keeler et
al. (1996) that suggest a $1 increase in the
tobacco tax increases the price of cigarettes
by $1.11. This is encouraging, considering
that Keeler et al. use annual state level
data (from 1960–1990) and identify the
parameter of interest from a series of state
tax changes. However, both the Keeler et
al. estimate and the estimates presented in
this paper are substantially smaller than the
estimate by Harris (1987) that suggests a $1
increase in the cigarette tax would result in
a retail price increase of over $2.
20

Our estimation strategy offers several advantages over those used in the
previous studies. First, because we use
micro-level data from retail locations we
are able to accurately match county and
city taxes to our observations. This is in
sharp contrast to previous studies that use
state-year level observations that cannot
separate city and county level taxes or
differentiate when during the year a tax
is imposed. This is particularly important
considering that county taxes are as much
as $2 per pack, city taxes are as much as 68
cents per pack in our sample, and tobacco
prevention groups estimate at least 450
jurisdictions nationwide have a separate
tax on tobacco.20

See Research Center for Tobacco Free Kids, “Research Center Fact Sheets,” http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/
research/factsheets/index.php?CategoryID=18.
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Second, we are able to use an isolated
policy change that offers clean identification of the tobacco tax increase on retail
prices. We discuss the robustness of this
strategy in the following section, but it
is noteworthy that tobacco tax increases
could become law at the same time as
other prevention methods or policies that
may affect the demand for cigarettes (an
alcohol tax change for instance). Lastly,
our data come from an extremely short
time window and relatively small geographic area compared to studies that use
state-year variation. This is advantageous
as we do not have to correct for inflation
over time or adjust for changes in the cost
of living when we use the difference-indifference method.
Over-shifting of the tobacco tax is
consistent with over-shifting found in
studies of alcohol tax incidence; however
alcohol tax studies generally find a substantially larger amount of over-shifting.21
Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) use
state-year tax variation to identify the
incidence of alcohol taxation and find
that it is over-shifted to consumers by as
much as 186 percent of the tax. Kenkel
(2005) uses a 2002 alcohol tax increase in
the state of Alaska as a natural experiment
to calculate the incidence of taxation on
beer, wine and spirits. Kenkel finds that
alcohol taxes are more than fully shifted
to consumers across multiple brands and
types of alcohol, and that for some brands
the amount of over-shifting is more than
400 percent of the tax. Rojas (2008) uses
the 1991 increase in the federal excise tax
on beer as a natural experiment to assess
a variety of pricing models in the beer
industry; his work implies that beer taxes
are more than fully passed on to consumers by as much as 237 percent of the tax.
21

22

Generally the empirical work on gasoline excise taxes shows that these taxes are
not over-shifted to consumers. Chouinard
and Perloff (2004) estimate the incidence
of gasoline taxes and find that a 1 cent
increase in the federal tax raises the retail
price by 0.47 cents, but that an increase in
the state gasoline tax by 1 cent raises the
retail price by 1.01 cents. Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) use suspensions and
subsequent reinstatements of the gasoline
sales taxes in Illinois and Indiana as natural
experiments to estimate the incidence of
gasoline taxation and find less than full
shifting of the tax to consumers. In addition, they find some evidence that suggests
stores react differently to tax changes as the
distance from the state border increases.
Alm, Sennoga, and Skidmore (2009) use
monthly data from ACCRA over the period
1984–1999 to estimate that gasoline taxes
are fully shifted to consumers.
Economic theory suggests that in a perfectly competitive market with constant
marginal costs, excise taxes will be fully
passed to consumers but never over-shifted.
Over-shifting results are often explained
using models of imperfect competition.
These models, advanced by Delipalla and
Keen (1992), and Anderson, de Palma,
and Kreider (2001), show how the type of
product (homogeneous or differentiated),
the type of imperfect competition (Bertrand,
Cournot, oligopoly), and the demand elasticity for the product explain the incidence
of per unit and ad valorem taxes.
Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider
(2001) show that in markets with a differentiated product where the sellers
have an oligopoly, firms engage in price
or Bertrand competition, and a unit tax
is imposed, the tax can be over-shifted to
consumers in the form of higher prices.22

Estimates on the incidence of general sales taxes find that the amount of tax burden passed on to consumers
varies substantially across the type of product used to create the estimates, although some estimates show
evidence of substantial over-shifting as shown by Besley and Rosen (1999) and Poterba (1996).
Anderson, de Palma, and Kreider (2001) also show this result holds if firms compete by changing output, or
in a Cournot game.
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zero.24 Although the Delipalla and Keen
model fits the empirical work better, the
assumption of a homogenous product
may be strong in the case of cigarettes
depending on if consumers view brands
as different products, as there are 278
brands of cigarettes certified for sale in
Wisconsin.25
The Delipalla and Keen model is also
helpful in understanding the differences in
some of our incidence estimates between
generic and name brand cigarettes.26 One
explanation for this difference is that the
demand elasticity is different for name
brand and generic cigarettes. Using the
Delipalla and Keen formula for overshifting27 the amount of over-shifting difference we observe in the full panel (Table
5, column 1) implies that generic brand
cigarettes have a demand elasticity that is
–0.29 and that name brand cigarettes have a
demand elasticity that is –0.22.28 This result
implies that consumers are more sensitive
to price changes in generic brand cigarettes. This is somewhat counter-intuitive if
generic and name brand cigarette consumers are the same group. However, if these
groups are different sets of consumers the
generic consumer group may be more price
sensitive if they have lower incomes. Alternatively, name-brand smokers may have
preferences for smoking that are shaped
by brand loyalty, making them less price
sensitive than generic brand smokers.
A second theoretical explanation for our
empirical findings is the model proposed

The intuition behind this result is that
in Bertrand competition, a given firm’s
best response, or reaction function, to a
price increase of a competitor is to also
increase prices. A tax increase can be
thought of as a price increase by one firm
that causes subsequent price increases
of other firms. Firms increase their own
prices because of the higher cost imposed
by the tax; this effect is magnified because
they are reacting to the higher price they
observe from competitors, resulting in
over-shifting of the tax to consumers. The
degree of the over-shifting of the tax in this
case depends on the slope of the firms’
reaction functions, or how much they
increase price in response to other firm’s
price increases. This explanation is intuitive, however; for over-shifting to occur
the model requires the product demand
elasticity to be less than negative one.23
This requirement is not likely to be met
in the case of cigarettes as estimates of the
price elasticity of demand for cigarettes,
as reviewed by Chaloupka and Warner
(2000), fall between –0.30 and –0.50.
The Delipalla and Keen (1992) model
requires a homogenous product, where
the sellers have an oligopoly, and firms
can enter the market freely (so that there
are no profits). This model fits the empirical elasticity of demand estimates better,
as over-shifting of a per-unit tax (assuming that firms have constant marginal
cost of production) will occur as long as
the product demand elasticity is less than
23

24

25

26

27

28

Young and Bielinska-Kwapiza (2002) also offer an explanation of over-shifting that requires the product
demand elasticity to be less than negative one.
Cotterill, Egan, and Buckhold (2001) offer an explanation of over-shifting that only requires negative demand
elasticity that is constant where the degree of over-shifting is also a function of the number of sellers.
See Wisconsin Department of Justice, “Directory of Certified Tobacco Manufacturers and Brands,” http://
www.doj.state.wi.us/dls/tobacco/index.html.
Although many of the incidence point estimates for the name brand cigarettes are within the 95 percent
confidence interval of the generic brand estimates (and vice versa), some of our primary results using panel
data suggest that tax incidence is statistically different for generic and name brand cigarettes.
Assuming that firms have constant marginal costs the rate of over-shifting, R is defined as R = 2/(2−(λE/n)),
where n is the number of sellers, λ is the change in industry output that occurs for a given firms change in
output and E is the absolute value of demand elasticity.
For this calculation we impose the additional assumption that firms react identically to a change in industry
output so that λ = n, as described in Delipalla and Keen.
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by Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994).
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy propose
that because cigarette companies work
as an oligopoly, they obtain maximum
profit by raising the price of their product on addicted smokers, or those who
have relatively inelastic demand and
will continue to smoke even after a tax
increase. Cigarette sellers realize that
they will lose casual or new smokers as
a result of the tax increase. However, the
profit gained from increasing the price
paid by addicted smokers will offset the
future losses from reduced smoking by
the casual or new smokers that results
from the price increase in excess of the
amount of the tax. Although the Becker,
Grossman, and Murphy model may
explain some of the price increase resulting from a tobacco tax increase, it does not
guarantee over-shifting like the Delipalla
and Keen and Anderson, de Palma, and
Kreider models do for certain demand
elasticities.
Finally, some of the over-shifting of
the cigarette tax in Wisconsin could be
the result of retailers using a simple costplus pricing mechanism. Wisconsin has a
“minimum mark up” law on retail sales
of cigarettes (The Unfair Sales Act, Wis.
Stats s 100.30). This law requires retail
cigarette venders to sell cigarettes for at
least 6 percent more than the cost, including the tobacco tax, of buying them from
a wholesaler or manufacturer. Because
of this law, retailers would require a cost
adjustment from wholesalers to legally
adjust their prices by less than the amount
of the tax increase. If wholesalers do not
adjust cost, and retailers increase the
price by the amount of the tax plus the
minimum mark-up we would expect that
the tax to be passively over-shifted in the
form of higher prices. This might account
for some, but not all, of the over-shifting
that we observe.
29

C. Methodology Concerns and
Robustness Checks
There are two main criticisms of our
methodology for identifying the incidence
of tobacco taxation that we have not yet
addressed. The first is that although we
look at prices in Wisconsin before and
after the tax change, we cannot rule out
that there are other factors that are causing
prices to change besides the tax increase.
The second is that retail cigarette outlets
in Wisconsin may be changing the price
of their product prior to the date of the
tax increase in response to the looming
law change and that this response biases
our estimates.
The difference-in-differences identification strategy we use assumes that the
price change that would have occurred in
Wisconsin in the absence of the tax change
is equal to the price change that actually
occurred over the same time period in
the Border States. We believe that our
assumption is reasonable considering that
the average price change in Border States
for name brand cigarettes was less than 1
cent and for generic brand cigarettes was
1 cent. This does not, however, rule out
that other factors in Wisconsin changed
during the period covered by our data.
We are aware of one minor law change
in Wisconsin that may have altered the
price of cigarettes in addition to the tax
increase. Beginning January 1, 2008, Wisconsin began offering a free two-week
supply of tobacco cessation medication
to anyone requesting it through a tollfree phone call. The medication includes
nicotine patches, gum and lozenges.29 The
offer is for a one-time supply and ranges
in value between $50–100. According
to conversations with administrators at
Wisconsin’s Office of Tobacco Prevention and Control, only 7,768 medication
packets were distributed in January, 2008.

See University of Wisconsin Center for Tobacco Research and Intervention, “Quit Line,” at http://www.ctri.
wisc.edu/.
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tobacco sellers, the economic incidence is
often assumed to fall largely on tobacco
consumers. The evidence presented in this
paper suggests that not only do consumers pay the entire economic burden of the
tobacco tax, but that they also pay a premium in addition to the amount of tax. We
find that the incidence of tobacco taxation
is over-shifted to consumers by between
8–17 percent of the amount of the tax. This
amount of over-shifting is similar to that
found by Keeler et al. (1996), although our
data and methodology differ substantially.
The over-shifting we find is substantially
smaller than the over-shifting of general
sales taxes that Besley and Rosen (1999)
find for some products (such as bread
and underwear). The smaller over-shifting
that we find is consistent with consumers
being relatively more price sensitive for
cigarettes compared with the necessitytype products with few (if any) substitutes
that find larger amounts of over-shifting.
It seems that over-shifting of the tax
is aiding policy makers in reducing consumption of cigarettes in Wisconsin. Data
on the amount of cigarettes purchased in
Wisconsin show that cigarette sales have
declined since the introduction of the tax.
The number of packs of cigarettes sold in
Wisconsin decreased from 394 million in
2007 to 335 million in 2008,30 a decline of
nearly 59 million packs.31 The reduction
in cigarettes purchased was not enough
to offset revenue gains from the increased
amount of tax, as tax revenues from cigarette sales in Wisconsin increased from
$298 million 2007 to $589 million in 2008.
Our paper is unique in that we are
able to estimate how the incidence of a
cigarette tax depends on the distance that
a retail location is from the border of a
state where taxes are different. We show
that the amount of over-shifting is in fact

Considering that there are approximately
1.1 million smokers in Wisconsin, the
tobacco cessation medication program
reached far less than one percent of the
smoking population. We believe that any
potential bias in our estimates from this
program would work toward lowering
our estimated coefficients. We are not
aware of any other law change or trends
that would affect our results.
We also examined whether the possibility that firms might alter their prices
in anticipation of tax change might be a
serious problem. Specifically, we administered a secondary survey of establishments in our sample to ask them about
this possibility. We randomly selected 50
stores in Wisconsin from our sample and
asked them about the timing of their price
changes as a result of the tax increase.
Specifically, we asked the establishment
manager if they had changed prices on
exactly January 1, 2008. Of the 50 store
managers surveyed, 49 stated that they
had changed prices exactly on January 1.
The lone exception stated that they had
waited until about a week after January
1 to increase prices. We also asked if they
had changed cigarette prices prior to the
January 1 tax policy change. None of
the 50 respondents in our survey stated
that they changed prices in anticipation
of the tax change. Although the sample
size is quite small, these survey results
support our assumption that cigarette
prices did not change in anticipation of
the tax change.
V. CONCLUSION
Tobacco taxes represent about $22 billion dollars annually in federal and state
government revenues. Although the
statutory incidence of these taxes falls on
30
31

This information was obtained through personal correspondence with the Wisconsin Department of Revenue.
We hesitate to infer causality, as we are not making this comparison with neighboring states that may be
affected by similar overall trends in cigarette purchases. It is also possible that the decreased purchases in
Wisconsin are offset by increased smuggling across state borders.
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sensitive to how far a retail establishment
is from a state border. The amount of overshifting is between 53–71 percent less for
stores near the Minnesota border (where
the tobacco tax is lower after the tax
change in Wisconsin). In contrast, stores
near the Michigan border (where the
tobacco tax is higher before and after the
law change) gain at least 93 percent and
at most 149 percent of the over-shifting
premium. The difference in over-shifting
premiums is consistent with recent evidence presented by Lovenheim (2008) on
casual cigarette smuggling across state
borders. The relationship between cigarette prices, smuggling, and distance to a
state’s border suggests that policy makers
may want to coordinate tax rates or tax
rate increases with neighboring states if
the goal is to reduce tobacco consumption.
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